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Introduction 
Since the events of 9/11 commentators have debated the appropriate legal framework for 
responding to the threat of terrorism. Some, like the Bush Administration, advocated a military 
response. Others argued that, whilst terrorism should be distinguished from warfare, the gravity of 
the contemporary terrorist threat justifies exceptional or emergency measures which operate 
outside of the normal legal framework and/or are temporally limited.1 Still others urged the 
importance of a criminal justice based response in which the criminal law is deployed to prosecute 
suspected terrorists.2 One of the principal arguments in favour of the latter approach is that it has 
greater moral authority and is more protective of human rights. The criminal law requires the state 
to prove its case in open court beyond reasonable doubt and gives the suspect the opportunity to 
respond to the case against him. 
As the contributions to this volume show, those responding to the growing threat of cyberattacks 
also face this choice between different legal frameworks. This chapter contributes to this debate by 
providing a critical assessment of the UK’s criminal justice based response to the threat of 
cyberterrorism. The chapter will show that, in fact, the different legal frameworks are not mutually 
exclusive. In recent years the UK has introduced a range of terrorism-related legislation. This has not 
only significantly extended the criminal law’s reach, so that it encompasses both a wide range of 
preparatory activities and individuals who are only loosely connected to a feared attack. It has also 
indirectly diminished the procedural rights of suspected terrorists and provides for the imposition of 
severe sanctions which are rooted in a precautionary approach based on potential future harms. 
These are all marked departures from the normal standards of the criminal law and so, it will be 
argued, may be understood as the convergence of the criminal justice and exceptional measures 
approaches: in other words, as a form of enemy criminal law. The chapter argues that it is 
contradictory – and, ultimately, self-defeating – to insist on a criminal justice based framework 
without adhering to the features which give the criminal law its moral authority in the first place. 
 
The inclusion of cyberattacks within the UK’s definition of terrorism 
Increasing attention is being paid to the threat of cyberattack. In November 2013 the heads of the 
FBI, Department of Homeland Security and National Counterterrorism Center told Congress that 
cyberattacks are likely to eclipse 9/11-style terrorist attacks as a domestic danger over the next 
                                                          
1
 Some well-known examples include: Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an 
Age of Terrorism (Yale University Press 2006); Richard A Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time 
of National Emergency (Oxford University Press 2006); Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of 
Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
2
 See for example David Bonner, Executive Measures, Terrorism and National Security: Have the Rules of the 
Game Changed? (Ashgate 2007); David Cole and Jules Lobel, Less Safe Less Free: Why America is Losing the 
War on Terror (The Free Press 2007); Conor Gearty, ‘The Superpatriotic Fervour of the Moment’ (2008) 28 
OJLS 183; Gary Lefree and James Hendrickson, ‘Build a Criminal Justice Policy for Terrorism’ (2007) 6 
Criminology & Pub Pol’y 781. 
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decade.3 These attacks, they predicted, will come from individual actors as well as nation states.4 
Analysis of the Stuxnet malware – which damaged centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment 
facility in Iran – has concluded that it could be used as a blueprint for cyber-physical attacks in the 
future. These would most likely focus on targets which are easier to attack, such as critical 
infrastructure installations, and importantly would not require nation-state resources.5 
Warnings of the threat posed by cyberterrorism are not new. In 1997 Barry Collin of the US Institute 
for Security and Intelligence stated that the potential for multiple casualties and considerable 
publicity are likely to make cyberattacks desirable to terrorist groups. He gave the examples of 
contaminating food products through interference with manufacturing processes and the 
interception of air traffic control systems to engender fatal collisions.6 Weimann has identified a 
total of five reasons why terrorists might choose to launch cyberattacks: comparatively lower 
financial costs; the prospect of anonymity; a wider selection of available targets; the ability to 
conduct attacks remotely; and, the potential for multiple casualties.7 Related utility maximisation 
arguments suggest it is inevitable terrorists will employ cyber weaponry if benefits from doing so are 
likely,8 and/or if an enemy employs computers and networks as security tools or maintains 
dominance in this area.9 Indeed, in a recent survey of the global research community 58% of 
respondents stated that cyberterrorism poses a significant threat, with a further 12% saying that it 
may potentially become one.10 
The UK Government considered the threat of cyberterrorism as part of its review of the definition of 
terrorism in the late 1990s. As part of this review, it published a consultation paper in 1998 which 
proposed a new statutory definition of terrorism.11 This document rejected Lord Lloyd’s earlier 
suggestion that the UK adopt the working definition of terrorism then in use by the FBI.12 One of the 
Government’s criticisms of the FBI’s definition was that cyberattacks perpetrated by terrorists fell 
outside of its scope. The Government stated that such attacks might not only ‘result in deaths and 
injuries’, but also ‘result in extensive disruption to the economic and other infrastructure of this 
country’.13 To illustrate the last of these, the Government offered the example of contamination of a 
public utility system such as a water or sewage works. 
The resultant definition can be found in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. For an act to qualify to 
as terrorist, it must satisfy three criteria. First, one of five specified actions must have either been 
used or threatened. These are: serious violence against a person; serious damage to property; 
endangering another person’s life; creating a serious risk to public health or safety; or, the focus of 
this chapter, actions which are ‘designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
                                                          
3
 Spencer Ackerman, ‘Cyber-attacks eclipsing terrorism as gravest domestic threat – FBI’ The Guardian 
(London, 14 November 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/14/cyber-attacks-terrorism-
domestic-threat-fbi> accessed 29 November 2013. 
4
 ‘Cyberattacks more serious domestic threat to U.S. than terrorism’ (Homeland Security News Wire, 20 
November 2013) <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131120-cyberattacks-more-serious-
domestic-threat-to-u-s-than-terrorism-fbi> accessed 29 November 2013.  
5
 Ralph Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve (The 
Langner Group 2013). 
6
 Barry Collin, ‘The Future of Cyberterrorism’ (1997) 13 Crime and Justice International 15. 
7
 Gabriel Weimann, Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat? (Special Report 119, United States Institute of 
Peace 2004) <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr119.pdf> accessed 29 November 2013.  
8
 Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, ‘America and the New Terrorism’ (2000) 42 Survival 59. 
9
 Jerrold M Post, Kevin G Ruby and Eric D Shaw, ‘From Car Bombs to Logic Bombs: The Growing Threat from 
Information Terrorism’ (2000) 12 Terrorism and Political Violence 97. 
10
 Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and Lella Nouri, ‘The Cyberterrorism Threat:  Findings from a Survey of 
Researchers’ (2014) 37 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 68. 
11
 Home Office, Legislation Against Terrorism: A Consultation Paper (Cm 4178, 1998). 
12
 Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism (Cm 3420, 1996). 
13
 Home Office, Legislation Against Terrorism (n 11) para 3.16. 
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electronic system’.14 Second, the action (or threat) must have been designed either to influence the 
government or an international governmental organization, or to intimidate the public or a section 
of the public.15 Third, the action (or threat) must have been made for the purpose of advancing a 
political, religious, racial or ideological cause.16 The application of the definition is not limited to the 
UK; it applies equally to actions outside the UK, to people and property outside the UK and to 
foreign governments.17 
The UK’s definition unquestionably has a broad scope.18 In respect of cyberattacks, it is not limited to 
attacks on critical infrastructures. Attacks on anything deemed to be an electronic system could 
potentially qualify (such as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack).19 Moreover, the attack 
need not actually cause serious interference or disruption. It is enough that it was designed to. This 
far-reaching definition is expanded still further by the fact that it: applies to threats of cyberattacks 
as well as actual attacks; applies to cyberattacks which are designed merely to influence, not 
intimidate, a government; applies equally to all governments, however oppressive; and, contains no 
exemption for political protest or self-determination.20  
For present purposes what is most important about the UK’s definition is that it treats 
cyberterrorism as a subset of the broader category of terrorism, in spite of possible qualitative 
differences between cyberterrorism and traditional, physical forms of terrorism.21 By so doing, it 
grants access to the full panoply of terrorism-related investigative powers, procedures, criminal 
offences and sentencing powers in any case involving a cyberterrorist attack that falls within the 
broadly couched statutory definition. The UK has thus sought to respond to the threat of 
cyberterrorism by using criminal laws and processes – as opposed to the law of war or emergency 
powers – just as it has done for traditional terrorism. The remainder of this chapter evaluates this 
criminal justice based response. 
 
Enemy criminal law as a descriptive concept 
The concepts of ‘enemy criminal law’ (Feindstrafrecht) and ‘citizen criminal law’ (Bürgerstrafrecht) 
were first advanced by the German professor of criminal law, Günther Jakobs.22 Intended as ideal-
types, the aim of these concepts was to draw attention to two contrasting tendencies within the 
criminal law (as opposed to two isolated spheres of criminal law).23  
According to Jakobs, since trust alone is not a sufficient basis for individuals in society to engage with 
one another the role of law is to enable interaction. But law can only perform this function if 
                                                          
14
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(2). 
15
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(b). If the relevant action involved the use of firearms or explosives it is 
unnecessary to show that section 1 (1)(b) is also satisfied (s 1(3)). 
16
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(1)(c). 
17
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(4). 
18
 The breadth of the definition was criticised by the Supreme Court in R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64, [2013] 3 WLR 
1207 [28]-[29], [33]-[37], [61]-[64]. See also Keiran Hardy and George Williams, ‘What is “Terrorism”?: 
Assessing Domestic Legal Definitions’ (2011) 16 UCLA J Int’l L & For Aff 77, 111-20. 
19
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 1(2)(e). 
20
 Keiran Hardy and George Williams, ‘What is Cyberterrorism? Computer and Internet Technology in Legal 
Definitions of Terrorism’ in Tom Chen, Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald (eds), Cyberterrorism: Understanding, 
Assessment and Response (Springer 2014). 
21
 Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald, ‘What is Cyberterrorism? Findings from a Survey of Researchers’ (2014) 
Terrorism & Political Violence <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2013.847827> 
accessed 1 July 2014. 
22
 Jakobs presented his theory at a major conference held in Berlin in 1999: G Jakobs, ‘Selbstverständnis der 
Strafrechtswissenschaft vor den Herausforderungen der Gegenwart (Kommentar)’ in A Eser, W Hassemer and 
B Burkhardt (eds), Die Deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft vor der Jahrtausendwende (Beck 2000). 
23
 Günther Jakobs, ‘Bürgerstrafrecht und Feindstrafrecht’ [2004] HRR-Strafrecht 88. 
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members of society believe that legal norms are generally recognized and respected. Citizens (a 
term which Jakobs uses synonymously with persons24) are therefore expected to cultivate loyalty to 
the law. This ‘anchors the expectations of fellow members of the polity that the law will generally be 
followed, thereby enabling them to run their lives, if not in total security, at least without constant 
worry about being wronged’.25 When a citizen commits a crime, the validity of the applicable law is 
called into question. Punishment is a counter-response which reinforces the loyalty to the law of 
both the offender (by forcefully reminding him of his duties as a citizen) and members of society in 
general (by reaffirming the law and making it clear that the conduct is unacceptable). 
Citizen criminal law is therefore communicative. It assumes that the offender remains a loyal citizen 
and that the offending behaviour was a lapse which he now regards as a mistake, and so continues 
to address him as a ‘person-in-law’.26 By contrast, enemy criminal law is directed at individuals 
whose conduct manifests that they do not respect the validity of the legal system and no longer 
consider themselves bound by the law. Since these individuals do not provide others with this 
minimum level of cognitive reassurance, the legal system no longer regards them as citizens or 
persons but rather as a source of danger. Terrorists are the paradigmatic example of a non-citizen, 
because the terrorist lacks not only the requisite loyalty to law but also the interest in acting 
according to it.27 Other possible examples include sexual predators, organized crime and drug 
dealers. 
It follows that enemy criminal law is concerned not with communication or censure, but with 
management of risk. The enemy is one who demonstrates by his conduct that he can no longer 
minimally guarantee that he will conduct himself as a loyal citizen. Enemy criminal law therefore 
imposes sanctions not as retrospective punishment for past wrongdoing but prospectively in order 
to prevent future harms. 
As well as the change in discourse (waging war against an enemy), Jakobs identifies three principal 
features of enemy criminal law. This section of the chapter outlines these features and argues that 
all three are apparent in the UK’s raft of terrorism criminal offences. 
 
Pre-inchoate liability 
Few would deny that the criminal law has a preventive, as well as a punitive, function. As Ashworth 
and Zedner observe, ‘If a certain form of harmful wrongdoing is judged serious enough to 
criminalize, it follows that the state should assume responsibility for taking steps to protect people 
from it’.28 Indeed, as Duff remarks, ‘a law that condemned and punished actually harm-causing 
conduct as wrong, but was utterly silent on attempts to cause such harms, and on reckless risk-
taking with respect to such harms, would speak with a strange moral voice’.29 Most legal systems 
accordingly have the general inchoate criminal offences of encouraging/inciting crime, conspiracy 
and attempt. These offences have a preventive role, penalizing conduct before any harm actually 
occurs. What marks out enemy criminal law, however, is that it criminalizes conduct at a far earlier, 
pre-inchoate, stage.  
                                                          
24
 In contrast to some other accounts which also employ the concept of citizenhood: see further Markus D 
Dubber, ‘Citizenship and Penal Law’ (2010) 13 New Crim LR 190. 
25
 Daniel Ohana, ‘Trust, Distrust and Reassurance: Diversion and Preventive  Orders Through the Prism of 
Feindstrafrecht’ (2010) 73 MLR 721, 724. 
26
 ibid 724. 
27
 Dubber, ‘Citizenship and Penal Law’ (n 24). 
28
 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, ‘Prevention and Criminalization: Justifications and Limits’ (2012) 15 
New Crim LR 542, 543. 
29
 RA Duff, Criminal Attempts (Clarendon Press 1996), 134. 
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In the UK, it has been deemed necessary to supplement the ordinary inchoate offences in terrorism 
cases. Although there have been some high profile convictions,30 the offences of conspiracy and 
encouraging crime are notoriously hard to prove. Obtaining admissible evidence of an agreement or 
words of encouragement within secretive organizations is difficult, particularly given the UK’s ban on 
the use of intercept as evidence in criminal trials.31 Moreover, even if admissible evidence is 
obtained it may lack evidential value (many members of terrorist organizations observe good 
communications security and disguise the content of their communications) or there may be public 
interest reasons for not disclosing it (perhaps because it would expose other on-going investigations 
or reveal sensitive techniques or capabilities).32 Meanwhile, the offence of criminal attempts has a 
limited reach. Narrower in scope than the US Model Penal Code’s ‘substantial step’ test, the test in 
the UK is whether the defendant committed an act that was ‘more than merely preparatory’ to 
commission of the planned offence.33 In other words, a defendant does not commit a criminal 
attempt until he actually ‘embarks upon the crime proper’.34 Given the level of risk and severity of 
the potential harm in terrorism cases, there are strong reasons to (in the words of the UK’s 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation) ‘defend further up the field’.35 This is the role of the 
pre-inchoate – or precursor – terrorism offences. 
There are a large number of terrorism precursor offences in the UK, found predominantly in the 
2000 and 2006 Terrorism Acts. These penalize a wide range of preparatory activities, including: fund-
raising for terrorist purposes;36 use or possession of money or other property for terrorist 
purposes;37 possession of an article for terrorist purposes;38 collecting information or possessing a 
document likely to be useful to a terrorist;39 training for terrorism;40 attendance at a place used for 
terrorist training;41 and, the catch-all offence of preparation of terrorist acts.42 In recent years this 
expanding use of the criminal sanction has received much attention from criminal law theorists.43 As 
well as raising concerns about possible overreaching and the impact on human rights and rule of law 
values, this literature has offered possible principled justifications for these offences.44 Wörner has 
suggested that the group-danger rationale that underpins the general offence of conspiracy could 
                                                          
30
 Including Abu Hamza’s conviction for soliciting to commit murder and the convictions of seven men on 
conspiracy charges in the airline liquid bomb plot case. 
31
 For discussion of the ban on intercept evidence, see Stuart Macdonald, ‘Prosecuting Suspected Terrorists: 
Precursor Crimes, Intercept Evidence and the Priority of Security’ in Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister (eds), Critical 
Perspectives on Counter-terrorism (Routledge 2014). 
32
 Home Office, Privy Council Review of Intercept as Evidence: Report to the Prime Minister and the Home 
Secretary (Cm 7324, 2008). 
33
 Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1). 
34
 R v Gullefer [1990] 1 WLR 1063. 
35
 David Anderson QC, ‘Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism Without Defeating the Law’ [2013] 
EHRLR 233, 237. 
36
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 15. 
37
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 16. 
38
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 57. 
39
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 58. 
40
 Terrorism Act 2006, s 6. 
41
 Terrorism Act 2006, s 8. 
42
 Terrorism Act 2006, s 5. 
43
 See for example AR Duff, L Farmer, SE Marshall, M Renzo and V Tadros (eds), The Boundaries of the Criminal 
Law (Oxford University Press 2010); AP Simester and A von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the 
Principles of Criminalisation (Hart Publishing 2011); Ashworth and Zedner, ‘Prevention and Criminalization: 
Justifications and Limits’ (n 28); GR Sullivan and I Dennis (eds), Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission 
of Criminal Harms (Hart Publishing 2012). 
44
 For an alternative perspective that preparatory acts should not, in general, be criminalized but regulated 
using a system of civil orders, see Daniel Ohana, ‘Responding to Acts Preparatory to the Commission of a 
Crime: Criminalization or Prevention’ (2006) 25 Criminal Justice Ethics 23. 
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also apply to many of the terrorism precursor offences. When a defendant provides weapons, 
training manuals or practical advice his behaviour ceases to be part of his ‘internum’ and becomes 
part of the ‘externum’.45 His behaviour may endanger others and, crucially, he is no longer able to 
control what happens next. An alternative, subjectivist, justification is provided by Simester and von 
Hirsch. They explain that the principal difficulty with imposing criminal liability on ‘remote harms’ 
(actions which do not themselves directly cause harm to others, such as collecting information, 
possessing items or raising funds) is that the feared eventual harm is contingent upon some other 
person or the defendant himself choosing to behave in a particular way in the future. They argue 
that to hold someone responsible now for the possible future acts of others is contrary to the 
fundamental right to be treated as autonomous individuals who are distinctively responsible for 
their own actions, whilst to hold someone responsible now for their own possible future actions is to 
undermine their autonomy and treat them as being incapable of deliberation and self-control.46 
Criminal liability for remote harms can therefore only be justified, they argue, if the defendant ‘in 
some sense affirms or underwrites’ the subsequent choice to cause harm.47 They name this the 
principle of normative involvement: if a defendant endorses the potential future harmful actions of 
either himself or another, responsibility for the future harm may fairly be imputed to him. 
These principled justifications provide a useful yardstick for evaluating the scope of the existing raft 
of terrorism precursor offences. What is readily apparent is that some of the offences overreach.48 
An example is the offence of collecting information or possessing a document likely to be useful to a 
terrorist. Not only does this offence not require any proof that the defendant had shared the 
information or document so that it was no longer under his exclusive control. It also requires no 
proof whatsoever of a terrorist connection or purpose. As a result, in R v G49 the House of Lords 
upheld the conviction for this offence of a man who, whilst in custody for non-terrorism offences, 
collected information on explosives and bomb-making and left it in his cell for a guard to find. The 
defendant was a paranoid schizophrenic who, it was accepted, wanted to antagonize the prison staff 
because he believed that they had been whispering about him. In a case like this one, the effect of 
this offence is to ‘make a terrorist out of nothing’.50  
It is also important to point out that proof of normative involvement should be regarded as a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for criminalization. There may be reasons not to enact an 
offence even if its terms do require proof that the defendant intended to commit, or had normative 
involvement in, future terrorist acts. An example is the offence of preparation of terrorist acts. A 
defendant commits this offence if he engages in ‘any conduct’ with an intention to commit or assist 
acts of terrorism.51 Any form of conduct could potentially be penalized by this offence if carried out 
with the requisite intention. Simester offers the example of an individual who eats muesli for 
breakfast as part of a fitness programme in preparation for a terrorist act.52 Where the conduct 
charged is something innocuous, the authorities will need to find some other evidence that the 
individual performed the act with the necessary intention. This could result in intrusive methods of 
policing. There is also the danger that the offence will be enforced in a discriminatory manner, with 
                                                          
45
 Liane Wörner, ‘Expanding Criminal Laws by Predating Criminal Responsibility – Punishing Planning and 
Organizing Terrorist Attacks as a Means to Optimize Effectiveness of Fighting Against Terrorism’ (2012) 13 
German LJ 1037, 1052. 
46
 Simester and von Hirsch (n 43) 80-81. 
47
 Ibid 81.  
48
 See further Carlile and Macdonald, ‘The Criminalization of Terrorists’ Online Preparatory Acts’ in Tom Chen, 
Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald (eds), Cyberterrorism: Understanding, Assessment and Response (Springer 
2014). 
49
 [2009] UKHL 13, [2010] 1 AC 43. 
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 Jacqueline Hodgson and Victor Tadros, ‘How to Make a Terrorist Out of Nothing’ (2009) 72 MLR 984. 
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 Terrorism Act 2006, s 5(1). 
52
 AP Simester, ‘Prophylactic Crimes’ in GR Sullivan and I Dennis (eds), Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the 
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Published in J. D. Ohlin, K. Govern & C. Finkelstein (eds) Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts (Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
7 
 
certain groups feeling compelled to forgo some innocent behaviour for fear it may be misconstrued. 
Furthermore, there are numerous other precursor offences which already criminalize various 
specific forms of preparatory activity. The guidance notes which accompanied the legislation failed 
to identify any gaps that needed to be plugged.53 So it is unclear whether this catch-all offence is in 
fact necessary. 
The UK’s terrorism precursor offences not only extend the temporal reach of the criminal law. They 
also encompass a wider range of individuals, penalizing those with an associative or facilitative role 
as well as potential perpetrators and accessories.54 It reaches this wider range of individuals in four 
ways. First and foremost, there are a number of offences which target those with a supporting role, 
including: membership of a proscribed organization;55 support for a proscribed organization;56 
encouragement of terrorism;57 and, dissemination of terrorist publications.58 Second, these offences 
not only target acts which facilitate terrorist attacks, but also acts which facilitate the assistance or 
encouragement of terrorist attacks. So, for example, it is not only an offence for D1 to provide 
training to D2 with an intention that D2 will use the skills to commit a terrorist act. It is also an 
offence for D1 to provide training to D2 with an intention that D2 will use the skills to assist 
someone else (D3) to commit a terrorist act.59 Third, it is possible to commit many of the terrorism 
precursor offences in inchoate form. It is an offence, for example, to conspire to engage in conduct 
that is preparatory to an act of terrorism.60 Fourth, in certain circumstances the law governing 
inchoate offences allows one layer of inchoate liability to be layered upon another (so-called double 
inchoate liability). When these four features are combined, the potential reach of the precursor 
offences becomes clear. Together, they mean that it is an offence for an individual (D1) to 
intentionally encourage someone else (D2) to intentionally encourage someone else (D3) to cause 
someone else (D4) to publish a statement which indirectly encourages someone else (D5) to 
instigate someone else (D6) to commit an act of terrorism.61 Ordinarily, individuals who are several 
steps removed from the harm-causing conduct would be regarded as too remote to fall within the 
scope of the criminal law. 
 
The imposition of severe sanctions 
The second feature of enemy criminal law is the imposition of severe punishment. The rationale 
underlying these sanctioning powers is not the retributivist notion of communication and censure, 
but risk control. As a result, the sentences imposed for preparatory offences may be the same as 
those imposed for an attempt to cause the harm in question: 
[P]unishment is imposed uniformly, irrespective of the stage of apprehension prior to 
consummation of the offence, notwithstanding the principle that sanction severity should be 
commensurate with the blameworthiness of the actor as determined by the actual progress 
made toward the realisation of the criminal endeavour.62 
                                                          
53
 Available via <www.legislation.gov.uk >accessed 21 November 2013. 
54
 Lucia Zedner, ‘Terrorizing Criminal Law’ [2012] CLPH <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11572-012-
9166-9> accessed 21 November 2013. 
55
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 11. 
56
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 12. 
57
 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1. 
58
 Terrorism Act 2006, s 2. 
59
 Terrorism Act 2006, s 6(1). 
60
 Criminal Law Act 1977, s 1(1); Terrorism Act 2006, s 5(1). 
61
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The UK’s terrorism precursor offences carry severe sentencing powers. Of the eleven terrorism 
precursor offences already mentioned in this chapter, two have a maximum sentence of seven 
years’ imprisonment,63 five a maximum of ten years,64 two a maximum of fourteen,65 one a 
maximum of fifteen66 and the other a maximum of life imprisonment.67 In recent years there have 
been a number of successful prosecutions for these offences.68 In order to illustrate the potential 
severity of the sanctions, three of these cases will be outlined. 
First, the case of R v Worrell.69 In this case the police found a significant quantity of racist and right-
wing material in the defendant’s flat, including books, DVDs and Nazi memorabilia. The books 
included manuals on weapons and bomb-making. Officers also found some sodium chlorate, weed 
killer, matches, lighter fuel and fireworks. The defendant therefore had instructions on how to make 
an improvised explosive device and some of the materials necessary for their manufacture. At trial 
he was convicted of possession of articles for terrorist purposes70 (an offence which, it should be 
noted, requires a reasonable suspicion that the defendant intended to use the items for terrorism-
related activity71) and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment.72 At his appeal against sentence the 
Court of Appeal acknowledged that the defendant was not part of a conspiracy or terrorist cell, that 
he had not actually manufactured an explosive device or attempted to do so and that there was no 
evidence that any attack was actually planned or imminent. The Court nonetheless upheld the 
sentence of six years, pointing out that these considerations had been taken into account by the 
sentencing judge and that in cases where a defendant’s plan has progressed further the offence is 
punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment. A similar case to this one is R v Tabbakh.73 In this 
case the police searched the defendant’s flat and found three bottles, fertilizer and other chemicals, 
together with hand-written bomb-making instructions. Although the defendant had collected the 
correct ingredients, they were of a poor grade and would not in fact have exploded. He also had yet 
to make or obtain a detonator. At trial he was convicted of preparation of terrorist acts74 and 
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal against sentence, 
pointing out that although the bomb was not a viable one the maximum sentence for this offence is 
life imprisonment. 
Second, R v Karim.75 The defendant in this case had come to the UK from Bangladesh to study 
microelectronics. In 2006 he settled in the country with his wife and son, both of whom were British. 
In 2007 he began working at British Airways as a graduate IT specialist. In 2009 Karim’s younger 
brother went to Yemen, contacted the notorious Jihadist Anwar al-Awlaki and put him in contact 
                                                          
63
 Terrorism Act, ss 1 and 2 (encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications). 
64
 Terrorism Act 2000, ss 11, 12 and 58 (membership of a proscribed organization, support for a proscribed 
organization and collecting information or possessing a document likely to be useful to a terrorist); Terrorism 
Act 2006, ss 6 and 8 (training for terrorism and attendance at a place used for terrorist training). 
65
 Terrorism Act 2000, ss 15 and 16 (fund-raising for terrorist purposes and use or possession of money or 
other property for terrorist purposes). 
66
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 57 (possession of an article for terrorist purposes). 
67
 Terrorism Act 2006, s 5 (preparation of terrorist acts). 
68
 All successful prosecutions for terrorism-related offences are detailed on the website of the Counter-
Terrorism Division of the Crown Prosecution Service. See 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/ctd.html> accessed 27 November 2013. 
69
 R v Worrell [2009] EWCA Crim 1431, [2010] 1 Cr App R (S) 27. 
70
 Terrorism Act 2000, s 57. 
71
 R v Zafar [2008] EWCA Crim 184, [2008] QB 810. 
72
 He was also convicted on a separate count of racially aggravated intentional harassment, alarm or distress. 
For this offence he was sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment to be served consecutively, giving a total 
sentence of seven years and three months. 
73
 R v Tabbakh [2009] EWCA Crim 464, (2009) 173 JP 201. 
74
 Terrorism Act 2006, s 5. 
75
 R v Karim [2011] EWCA Crim 2577, [2012] 1 Cr App R (S) 85. 
Published in J. D. Ohlin, K. Govern & C. Finkelstein (eds) Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts (Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
9 
 
with Karim. Once al-Awlaki discovered that Karim worked for British Airways, he asked him about his 
knowledge of security and air travel. Karim responded by suggesting either a physical or electronic 
attack on British Airways computer servers. He also said that he might be able to get a package on-
board a plane. When al-Awlaki discovered that Karim wanted to leave the UK and go and fight in 
Yemen, al-Awlaki told him that he would be of more use if he remained in the UK. At trial, Karim was 
convicted on four counts of preparation of terrorist acts.76 The sentencing judge held that the 
sentence for these offences (twenty-four years) should be served consecutive to the sentence for an 
earlier period of activity in which Karim had sent money to help mujahideen in Pakistan/Afghanistan, 
produced a video in support of a terrorist organization and possessed a computer file containing 
instructions on making improvised explosive devices.77 So in total Karim was sentenced to thirty 
years’ imprisonment, with a further five year extension to be added to his licence period. At his 
appeal against sentence Karim’s counsel argued that the sentence was excessive because Karim had 
not ‘gone far down the road’.78 He had not actually set about doing anything concrete, and he might 
never have done anything. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and upheld Karim’s sentence. 
Whilst accepting that Karim might never have gone on to commit the acts he intended to commit, 
the Court said that this case was ‘quite different’ from other cases which involve ‘detailed planning 
by outsiders’: 
The gravamen of the case against this appellant was that he was in a position, and was told 
from the e-mails in January 2010 to remain in position in the front line so he would be able 
to carry out from the inside acts of terrorism. It seems us to us that someone in that position 
is someone who has gone very, very far down the route, and the fact that he has not actually 
started to put together the paraphernalia for bombing, but has maintained a position where 
he can act at once, puts him in a category of someone who has overtly committed himself to 
the probability of committing really serious acts of terrorism. Comparison with the other 
cases is therefore unjustified, in the sense that it was not necessary to show overt acts, or 
preparing bombs or the like. It was sufficient that he was a ‘sleeper’; he had maintained 
employment where he was in a position to act immediately.79 
Third, R v Gul.80 The defendant in this case was a Law student at a reputable University in London 
who, it is believed, radicalized himself over the Internet. When police searched his home they found 
videos on his laptop which he had uploaded to various websites including YouTube. The videos 
included martyrdom videos and ones which showed attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan by insurgents. At trial he was convicted on five counts of disseminating a terrorist 
publication81 and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Gul’s appeal against conviction focussed on 
whether the insurgents’ actions in the videos fell within the UK’s statutory definition of terrorism 
(with the Court holding that they do). Although he also sought leave to appeal against sentence, this 
was refused by the Court of Appeal.82 The Court noted the defendant’s young age, previous good 
character and the serious consequences for him for the rest of his life, but stressed the manner in 
which the videos glorified and encouraged attacks on UK forces overseas. A similar example is the 
conviction of Craig Slee on four counts of disseminating a terrorist publication.83 Slee was sentenced 
to five years for posting videos on Facebook of al-Qaeda beheading captives. The sentencing judge 
explained that, whilst Slee had no links to any terrorist organizations and no plans to engage in any 
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attack planning, the videos that Slee had distributed had been created in order to encourage people 
to rally to the terrorist cause.84 
In their discussion of terrorism precursor offences, de Goede and Graaf suggest that terrorism trials 
may be understood as a performative space in which ‘potential future terror is imagined, invoked, 
contested, and made real, in the proceedings and verdict, as well as through its wider media and 
societal echoes’.85 As the preceding paragraphs illustrate, this potential future may be one of a 
multiplicity of possible futures, and need not be a probable future. On the one hand, a repentant Gul 
expressed regret at his actions,86 the courts acknowledged that Slee had no terrorist connections or 
plans to commit an attack, that there was no evidence that Worrell was planning an attack, that 
Tabbakh’s bomb was not viable and that Karim might never have gone on to commit the acts he 
intended. On the other hand, the courts simultaneously stressed that the videos Gul and Slee posted 
might have encouraged others to commit terrorist acts, that Worrell had been stopped before he 
had been able to go further along the road to perpetrating a terrorist act, that Tabbakh was doing 
his best to make a viable bomb and that Karim was a sleeper agent who might have been utilized by 
al-Awlaki in the future. The imagining of potential futures thus provides a space for the 
‘incorporation of precautionary counterterrorism into criminal law’.87 This is just one example of the 
broader shift in criminal justice towards a pre-crime society,88 a society which Zedner describes as 
one ‘in which the possibility of forestalling risks competes with and even takes precedence over 
responding to wrongs done’.89 It is for this reason that Krasmann argues that enemy criminal law is 
in fact ‘not about criminal law, it marks rather a new paradigm of security policy’.90 
 
A reduction in defendants’ procedural rights 
The third feature of enemy criminal law is a reduction in the procedural rights of defendants. A stark 
example in the US is the trial of Guantanamo detainees by military commissions. By contrast, since 
9/11 the UK Government has not generally sought to introduce modifications to the criminal trial 
itself. In Northern Ireland, ‘Diplock Courts’ were introduced in 1973 in response to a report 
submitted to Parliament which addressed the problem of dealing with Irish republicanism through 
means other than internment.91 These courts consisted of a single judge, with the right to trial by 
jury suspended and a number of special rules as to pre-trial processes, evidence and punishment. 
But whilst Diplock Courts were common in the 1970s and 1980s in terrorism cases in Northern 
Ireland, they were abolished by the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007 and replaced 
with a new system of non-jury trial which only applies in exceptional circumstances.92 Moreover, 
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Diplock Courts were not introduced in the rest of the UK. And whilst since 2003 courts across the UK 
have had a general power to order a non-jury trial in cases where there is a ‘real and present danger’ 
of jury tampering,93 to date this power has only been used once. The defendants in this case were 
charged with the armed robbery of £1.75m from Heathrow Airport, not with terrorism offences.94 
Whilst the criminal trial itself has not been modified, however, there are two respects in which the 
procedural rights of suspected terrorists have been indirectly diminished. The first is the wording of 
many of the terrorism precursor offences. As Tadros has explained, ‘The fairness of a trial cannot be 
detached from the fairness of the offences which provide the basis of argument’.95 Not only does the 
UK’s statutory definition of terrorism have a very wide ambit.96 The conduct identified by the 
definitions of many of the terrorism precursor offences is also specified in broad terms, such as 
collecting any information of a kind likely to be useful to a terrorist,97 providing instruction in the use 
of any method for doing anything that is capable of being done for terrorist purposes,98 possession 
of any property,99 and even simply ‘any conduct’.100 Such broad definitions potentially render 
criminal law safeguards, particularly the beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof, ‘toothless’.101 
Procedural safeguards have little bite when offence definitions are so broad that almost all citizens 
fall within them. 
The breadth of many of the precursor offences has led Edwards to label them ‘ouster offences’.102 
He explains that there is a discrepancy within these offences between the offence definition and the 
wrong that is being targeted. The offence of encouragement of terrorism,103 for example, was 
targeted at extremists who promote a culture of hate, but is broad enough to also encompass North 
Korean exiles who criticize their native regime and those ‘like Cherie Blair, who express their ability 
to understand the actions of Palestinian suicide-bombers’.104 This is not analogous to offences that 
prohibit all possession of weapons – i.e., offences of necessitous over-inclusion – since those 
offences seek to guide all citizens away from possessing weapons even if their doing so would pose 
no risk. Terrorism precursor offences, on the other hand, do not seek to guide all citizens away from 
all of the conduct they encompass. Instead they operate as a ‘facilitation device’.105 Only some of 
those who fall within the offence definition will be selected for prosecution. It seems fair to assume 
that this choice will to a large extent be based on whether the individual is deemed to pose a threat 
to national security. But at trial the issue will be whether the requirements set out in the offence 
definition are satisfied. The national security considerations that led to the decision to prosecute will 
sit in the background. So ‘Even though the pursuit of security is central to the justification for the law 
itself, it is not open to challenge by the defendant with respect to his particular case’.106 The effect is 
to deprive the trial court of the opportunity to adjudicate on the actions that the offence is 
targeting. Whilst this might lighten the prosecutorial burden, it undermines the courts’ ability to 
deliver procedural justice. 
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The second way in which defendants’ procedural rights have been diminished is by the use of 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). Introduced in 2011 as a replacement for 
the Control Order regime, TPIMs are designed for use against individuals who are believed to be 
involved in terrorism-related activity where there is no prospect of successful prosecution or 
deportation.107 Although they are not as onerous as Control Orders,108 they may still impose a range 
of obligations and restrictions.109 These include: restrictions on travel and on places the individual 
may visit; restrictions on the individual’s use of financial services and electronic communication 
devices; restrictions on whom the individual may associate and communicate with; a requirement to 
report to a police station at specified times; electronic monitoring of the individual’s movements; 
and, a requirement that the individual reside at specified premises overnight.110 Two conditions 
must be satisfied for TPIMs to be imposed: first, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that 
the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity; and, second, the Home Secretary 
must reasonably consider that TPIMs are necessary in order to protect the public from a risk of 
terrorism. This latter condition has an obvious resonance with Jakobs’ account of enemy criminal 
law. Instead of focussing on punishing past actions of the individual, the test is forward-looking: are 
TPIMs necessary to protect the public from offending behaviour in the future. As Ohana explains, 
this implies that the authorities are expected to gauge the individual’s capacity and commitment to 
abide by the law: 
Were the competent authority to find that the actor is suitably disposed to steer himself as a 
responsible law-abiding citizen, then the making of a preventive order would not be called 
for: the actor could be trusted to act appropriately, without there being a need to monitor 
his conduct by setting special restrictions which do not apply to other citizens.111 
As one would expect given that TPIMs are intended for use in cases where prosecution is not a 
viable option,112 the procedure for imposing TPIMs differs from the ordinary criminal process. First of 
all, TPIMs are imposed by the Home Secretary not the courts.113 Although the Home Secretary must 
apply for the courts’ permission before imposing TPIMs (save in urgent cases114), the courts’ function 
at the permission hearing is simply to determine whether the Home Secretary’s decision to issue 
TPIMs is ‘obviously flawed’.115 Moreover, the permission hearing may take place in the absence of 
the individual, without the individual having had an opportunity to make representations to the 
court and/or without the individual having been notified of the application.116 Once the TPIMs notice 
has been served on the individual a review hearing must be held ‘as soon as reasonably 
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practicable’.117 Here the court reviews the Home Secretary’s decision that the conditions for issuing 
TPIMs were and continue to be met, applying the ‘principles applicable on an application for judicial 
review’.118 The court has the power to quash the TPIMs notice or specified measures within it and 
the power to direct the Home Secretary to revoke the TPIMs notice or modify specified measures 
within it.119 In order to ensure that information is not disclosed contrary to the public interest, the 
court may exclude the individual and his legal representative from all or part of the proceedings120 – 
although the House of Lords has ruled that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(the right to a fair trial) requires that an individual is always given ‘sufficient information about the 
allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations’.121 
During the closed sessions the interests of the individual are represented by a Special Advocate.122 
Before the closed materials are served the Special Advocate may communicate freely with the 
individual and his legal representative. Once the Special Advocate has been served, however, he may 
not communicate with either the individual or his lawyer123 (save in certain limited situations which 
are rarely utilized in practice124). This restriction on communication between Special Advocates and 
those whose interests they represent has been strongly criticised, with one Special Advocate even 
suggesting that it renders their efforts ‘pretty hopeless’.125 Yet notwithstanding the fact that TPIMs 
are imposed on a reduced standard of proof and the individual may not have seen all of the 
evidence against him, breach of a TPIMs notice without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence 
punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.126 This hybrid civil-criminal procedure (which has been 
employed in a number of different contexts in the UK127) has been likened to a Trojan horse128 and 
described as ‘an ingenious scheme for imposing harsh punishments yet by-passing the appropriate 
protections at the crucial stage of the proceedings’.129 
TPIMs also have the potential to circumvent the criminal law in a second way: authorities might 
choose to rely on TPIMs in cases where it would have been possible to prosecute. Although the UK’s 
counterterrorism strategy states that suspected terrorists should be prosecuted ‘wherever 
possible’,130 the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 does not require the 
courts to review the decision not to prosecute. Instead the Act imposes a requirement that before 
imposing TPIMs the Home Secretary must first consult with the police about the possibility of 
prosecution,131 with an additional obligation to keep the individual’s conduct under review with a 
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view to prosecution for the duration of the TPIMs notice.132 Having examined the cases of the ten 
men subject to TPIMs at the end of 2012, however, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation found no ‘undue reticence’ to prosecute on the part of the police, Crown Prosecution 
Service or MI5.133 Indeed, four of the ten men had previously been prosecuted for terrorism-related 
activity and in each case the jury had chosen not to convict. The Independent Reviewer commented: 
There is certainly an uncomfortable feel to the imposition of TPIMs on acquitted persons. 
The practice is however troubling not because it constitutes an abuse of the TPIM system, 
but because it reveals an unpalatable truth: that while it should always be the first and 
preferable option for dealing with suspected terrorists, the criminal justice system – whose 
open nature may prevent some relevant national security evidence from being used – is not 
always enough to keep the public safe.134 
Interestingly, the Independent Reviewer went on to say that in his experience (corroborated by 
other studies) the imposition of TPIMs has not generated feelings of resentment amongst Muslim 
communities, even though all ten of the men that were subject to TPIMs at the end of 2012 were 
Muslims.135 This appears to be because TPIMs have so far been used with restraint. He accordingly 
went on to warn that ‘the situation could rapidly change if TPIM notices begin to be used on a 
significantly greater scale, or against less apparently dangerous targets, than has been the case to 
date’.136 
 
Enemy criminal law as a prescriptive concept 
The concepts of citizen criminal law and enemy criminal law have great value as explicatory and 
analytical tools. But Jakobs’ account of enemy criminal law was also intended to be prescriptive.137 
He argued: 
Whoever does not provide sufficient cognitive reassurance of a law-abiding behaviour, not 
only cannot expect to be treated as a person by the State, but the State itself should not 
treat him as such, because if it does so, the State would be harming the right to security to 
which other persons are entitled. Hence it would be a terrible mistake to demonize what we 
are calling here ‘enemy criminal law’.138 
Whilst adding that too much enemy criminal law can damage the rule of law, Jakobs argued that if 
enemy criminal law is carefully disaggregated from citizen criminal law it can in fact preserve the 
integrity of the latter. This section of the chapter disputes this claim and advances four 
countervailing considerations which militate against the use of enemy criminal law. This is not to 
reject terrorism precursor offences, consequentialist sentencing or adapted, specially protective, 
criminal trials outright. There is a pressing need for criminal law theorists to evaluate whether, how 
and to what extent these may be justified.139 Rather, the argument is that terrorism-related criminal 
                                                          
132
 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, s 10(5)(a). 
133
 David Anderson QC, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2012: First Report of the 
Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (The 
Stationery Office 2013) 61. 
134
 ibid 62. 
135
 ibid ch 11. 
136
 ibid para 11.17. 
137
 On the distinction between ideal-types and ideals see Stuart Macdonald, ‘Constructing a Framework for 
Criminal Justice Research: Learning from Packer’s Mistakes’ (2008) 11 New Crim LR 257. 
138
 Quoted in Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez, ‘Enemy Combatants versus Enemy Criminal Law’ (2008) 11 New Crim LR 
529, 536. 
139
 For examples of some of the work done so far, see n 43. 
Published in J. D. Ohlin, K. Govern & C. Finkelstein (eds) Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts (Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
15 
 
laws and processes should not be regarded as existing in a separate realm where the ordinary rules 
and principles do not apply. 
First, the empirical basis for the claim that enemy criminal law can secure the (cognitive) 
requirements for the legal system to exist is uncertain at best. Gómez-Jara Díez uses systems theory 
to explain that the criminal law not only presupposes the existence of conditions that the criminal 
law itself is incapable of securing, but that ‘to the extent that the State uses enemy criminal law to 
secure citizen criminal law it risks the whole existence of the latter’.140 In a similar vein, Melía states 
that there is no empirical basis for thinking that the existence of harsh terrorism offences will ‘deter 
more or more efficiently than the use of a less draconian criminal law’.141 Similar criticisms have 
been levelled at the popular balancing metaphor: there is no empirical basis for the over-simplistic 
assumption that sacrificing liberty will automatically result in enhanced security.142 
Second is a danger that Jakobs himself adverted to, the possibility of enemy criminal law permeating 
into and contaminating citizen criminal law. Zedner, for example, has warned that whilst the 
introduction of exceptional measures is often controversial, ‘once enacted they become accepted 
and, over time, percolate down into the everyday criminal law’.143 This has been echoed by Melía: 
Thus, if such draconian measures creep into what has typically been considered legitimate 
and normal criminal laws, they may generate significant changes in which the logic of enemy 
criminal law slowly but surely contaminates our system of criminal law until it becomes the 
norm rather than the exception.144 
An example in the UK is the expansion in the use of Special Advocates. Introduced by the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, Special Advocates were originally only used in appeals in 
immigration and asylum cases where the Home Secretary’s decision was based on national security 
concerns.145 In the years since then Special Advocates have been deployed in numerous others 
contexts – including the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission,146 the Pathogens Access 
Appeal Commission,147 Employment Tribunals148 and Parole Board hearings,149 as well as TPIMs 
review hearings (as explained previously) – culminating in the Justice and Security Act 2013, which 
provides for the use of closed sessions in any civil proceedings before the High Court, Court of 
Appeal or Supreme Court where this is required in the interests of national security and the fair and 
effective administration of justice.150 
Third, enemy criminal law adopts a relativistic approach to substantive and procedural rights which 
is at odds with the universality of human rights.151 On this approach, human rights become 
conditional. They are not vested in the individual by virtue of their personhood, but have to be 
                                                          
140
 Díez, (n 138) 533.  
141
 Manuel Cancio Melía, ‘Terrorism and Criminal Law: The Dream of Prevention, the Nightmare of the Rule of 
Law’ (2011) 14 New Crim LR 108, 114. 
142
 Stuart Macdonald, ‘Why We Should Abandon the Balance Metaphor: A New Approach to Counterterrorism 
Policy’ (2008) 15 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 95; Stuart Macdonald, ‘The Unbalanced Imagery of Anti-Terrorism 
Policy’ (2009) 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol’y 519; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ 
(2003) 11 J Pol Phil 191; Lucia Zedner, ‘Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal Justice’ 
(2005) 32 J L & Soc 507. 
143
 Lucia Zedner, ‘Security, the State, and the Citizen: The Changing Architecture of Crime Control’ (2010) 13 
New Crim LR 379, 394. 
144
 Melía, ‘Terrorism and Criminal Law’ (n 141) 112. 
145
 John Ip, ‘The Rise and Spread of the Special Advocate’ [2008] PL 717. 
146
 Terrorism Act 2000, sch 3. 
147
 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, sch 6. 
148
 Employment Tribunals Act 1996, s 10. 
149
 R (Roberts) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45, [2005] 2 AC 738.  
150
 Justice and Security Act 2013, s 6. 
151
 Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘Violence and Massacres – Towards a Criminal Law of Inhumanity?’ (2009) 7 JICJ 5. 
Published in J. D. Ohlin, K. Govern & C. Finkelstein (eds) Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts (Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
16 
 
earned through loyalty to the law. Since the conditions for singling out citizens are so vaguely 
defined, this is capable of generating its own form of insecurity: anxiety that one’s human rights 
might be suspended. The alternative is to insist that human rights are absolute:  
Arguably the criminal law is better protected by insisting upon the citizenship status of those 
against whom criminal proceedings are brought; by maintaining, through the presumption of 
innocence, that they are law-abiding members of society until proven guilty; and by adhering 
to the protections of the criminal process even in the gravest case.152 
Closely connected to this is the final danger, that enemy criminal law will undermine the criminal 
law’s moral authority. To apply a diminished level of human rights protection to a specific group of 
people when many members of that group come from particular ethnic minorities is to risk 
undermining the legitimacy of Government both domestically and overseas.153 Moreover, as Fletcher 
argues, the discourse of loyalty and community is exclusionary. He states that enemy criminal law 
‘intensifies the perception of insiders and outsiders’, thereby returning us ‘to the most primitive way 
of handling criminals – expulsion, excommunication, and banishment’.154 The UK’s counterterrorism 
strategy emphasizes the importance of social inclusion in preventing radicalization.155 As this 
suggests, enacting exclusionary laws which generate resentment and ill-feeling is likely to prove 
counter-productive. 
 
Conclusion 
In the concept of enemy criminal law the ‘exceptional measures of the war on terror are legalized 
and incorporated into criminal law’.156 Using the concept as an analytical aid, this chapter has 
highlighted: the extensive reach of the UK’s raft of terrorism precursor offences; how potential 
futures and a precautionary desire to mitigate risk lead to the imposition of severe sentences on 
those convicted of these crimes; and, how the procedural rights of those accused of these offences 
have been indirectly diminished. As concern grows over the possibility of terrorists launching 
cyberattacks, and policymakers and legislators assess how best to respond to this threat, it is 
important to be mindful of the counter-productivity of enemy criminal law. Not only is there a 
danger that such laws will contaminate other parts of the criminal law and the legal system more 
generally, but the exclusionary discourse and relativistic conception of human rights are likely to 
generate resentment and ill-feeling amongst those communities most affected. Ultimately, it is self-
defeating to create new offences, procedures and sentencing powers which undermine the criminal 
law’s moral authority when this moral authority is the very reason for insisting that suspected 
terrorists should be prosecuted whenever possible in the first place. 
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